Jawohl Roxanna !
But 100 %?
There were indeed many other previous Reich immigrants from e.g? Peenemude
(later WSPG and Redstone) who contributed.
Plus US management scientists plus thousands US specialists who built Saturns
in the first place. Instead of lousy V2 bombs. Plus heroes who did it first:
Armstrong, Aldrin & Collins.
Lots of books written on this.
John D.
From: arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On ;
Behalf Of roxanna Mason
Sent: vrijdag 3 januari 2020 18:02
To: arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [AR] Re: AW&ST Space Tourism Accident Impact.
Saturn 1,1B&5 100% thanks to von Braun
On Fri, Jan 3, 2020 at 8:21 AM Anthony Cesaroni < <mailto:anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx>
anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The pogo problem was fixed on Titan and it exceeded the NASA specification when
done. The primary reason it was fixed was to meet the NASA man rated
specification. It was satisfactory for the USAF missile requirements. Two of
the biggest problems during development were second stage combustion
instability and starting the second stage at altitude.
Saturn was affected by system pogo as well. Nothing that a good rocket plumber
couldn’t fix.
Anthony J. Cesaroni
President/CEO
Cesaroni Technology/Cesaroni Aerospace
<http://www.cesaronitech.com/> http://www.cesaronitech.com/
(941) 360-3100 x101 Sarasota
(905) 887-2370 x222 Toronto
From: arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of
Rand Simberg
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:03 AM
To: arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [AR] Re: AW&ST Space Tourism Accident Impact.
Yes, but they did have to "man rate" Redstone, Atlas, and Titan II (of the same
vintage) to put people on top. They didn't just pull one off the assembly line.
And they had problems with Titan due to POGO.
On 2020-01-03 07:56, Anthony Cesaroni wrote:
Hi Bill,
I've always been fascinated with the Titan II.
"Titan was more reliable than Atlas, Saturn 1 better than Titan, etc."
I'm not sure a comparison between Titian and Saturn is a good example but I see
your point. Two completely different systems, conditions, mission profiles and
life cycle. Titan may have a number of aspects that are relevant to space
tourism vehicles however. A very well researched book about the Titan II system
is;
"Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile" By David Stumph. Narrated by John
Lescault (Audible) It's one of my favorites and I'm on my third read. Highly
recommended.
If the opportunity ever presented itself (it won't) I'd rather ride a Titan II
than any kludge produced by Scaled et al. The extent of system engineering that
was invested into Titan II is right up there with most cold war mega programs.
Given the scope, time and purpose of Titan, its success and performance were
exemplary but then again, it was a major cold war deterrent primarily and money
was no object. Its manned missions weren't too shabby either.
Anthony J. Cesaroni
President/CEO
Cesaroni Technology/Cesaroni Aerospace
<http://www.cesaronitech.com/> http://www.cesaronitech.com/
(941) 360-3100 x101 Sarasota
(905) 887-2370 x222 Toronto
From: <mailto:arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
<mailto:arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf
Of William Claybaugh
Sent: Thursday, January 2, 2020 2:32 PM
To: <mailto:arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [AR] Re: AW&ST Space Tourism Accident Impact.
Anthony:
I'm struck by what appears to be the use of Bayesian statistics to estimate the
probability of a fatal accident in 2021 given no such accident in 2020.
There is some justification for this in Aerospace Corporation's now cononical
conclusion that initial failures in new (expendable) space launch vehicles tend
to be design and production related whereas later failures tend to be process
related.
But a statistical analysis of the full history of human-rated American launch
vehicles suggests that while there were observable increases in reliability
within family, the big increases in reliability tended to be between families:
Titan was more reliable than Atlas, Saturn 1 better than Titan, etc.
This in turn suggests that any fatal accidents in the VG (or Blue) vehicles is
probably "cooked in" at this point. Since Blue has an escape system and VG does
not; we might also suggest that Blue is less likely to have a fatal accident,
thus potentially making it a more attractive option to customers.
Bill
On Thu, Jan 2, 2020 at 9:07 AM Anthony Cesaroni < <mailto:anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx>
anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Speculation article FYI.
Anthony J. Cesaroni
President/CEO
Cesaroni Technology/Cesaroni Aerospace
<http://www.cesaronitech.com/> http://www.cesaronitech.com/
(941) 360-3100 x101 Sarasota
(905) 887-2370 x222 Toronto
What Happens To Space Tourism If There Is A Fatal Accident?
<https://aviationweek.com/author/michael-bruno> Michael Bruno December 31, 2019
virgin galactic vss first flightCredit: Virgin Galactic
Next year is likely to herald the dawn of routine space tourism, with Virgin
Galactic anticipating its first commercial launch in 2020. One goal of
billionaire-backed upstarts such as Virgin, Blue Origin and others is to make
orbital experiences as common for paying passengers as flying on an airliner.
· Publicly traded Virgin Galactic's operational debut sparks accident
analyses
· Past is prologue and there might be more customer demand than fear
But as the Dec. 20 timer glitch that kept Boeing's Starliner spacecraft from
reaching its intended rendezvous with the International Space Station proves,
even an unmanned space mission that goes wrong can generate big headlines these
days. So, what happens to a business that provides space tourism if a tragic,
fatal mishap occurs, especially in the beginning of operations? Investors want
to know and, to a degree, publicly traded and regulated companies such as
Virgin Galactic need to have a response ready, because it is a key business
risk.
Virgin Galactic has responded, saying balancing risk with shareholder reward is
part of the business and investors and customers are being made aware of all
the risks
<https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/space/virgin-galactic-aims-fly-1500-space-tourists-year-2023>
(AW&ST Nov. 11-24, 2019, p. 47). Of course, Virgin Galactic's supplier Scaled
Composites already had a fatal crash in 2014 when one pilot died. But that was
in a testing phase, and investors want to know about business prospects now as
Virgin Galactic prepares for launching commercial service. In turn, financial
analysts are weighing in.
Opinions are divergent, with practically all analysts acknowledging that a bad
accident with a death toll has the potential to shut down Virgin Galactic. "A
major accident could slow or close the business, or cause demand to decline
significantly," Credit Suisse analyst Rob Spingarn and his team said in
November. "A catastrophic accident could leave the company valueless, in our
view."
But not everyone agrees that outcome is likely. Vertical Research Partners
analyst Darryl Genovesi, in his own November report, goes into detail about how
a fatal mishap may not necessarily ground space tourism. Genovesi's team looks
back on the NASA space shuttle and NASA-Defense Department X-15 programs for
guidance, as well as niche extreme-adventure marketplaces such as mountain
climbing, which serve the same level of wealthy clientele that space tourism
companies seek initially.
The Genovesi team believes the 1960s-era X-15 program, featuring the world's
first spaceplane, is the best comparison to Virgin Galactic's approach.
The X-15 was carried to an altitude of around 45,000 ft. by a mother ship, a
modified Boeing B-52, and then airdropped before firing its rocket engine and
accelerating to apogee in space, reentering, and gliding home to make a
horizontal landing. Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo (SS2) mission profile is
"very similar" to the X-15's, according to the Vertical analysts.
SS2s will be lofted to around 45,000 ft. by twin-fuselage mother ships called
WhiteKnightTwo, according to Virgin Galactic. The SS2 is then airdropped and a
rocket hybrid propulsion system called RocketMotorTwo kicks in to project the
SS2 into a space trajectory.
chartSource: Vertical Research Partners
In its time, three X-15s were built, completing 199 flights between 1959 and
1968, of which 13 flew higher than 50 mi., the altitude required for NASA to
recognize them as spaceflights and award astronaut wings to the pilots. The
X-15 experienced one total loss in 1967, near the end of its program, when
aircraft No. 3 broke apart during reentry, killing the pilot. The accident was
attributed to a combination of pilot error and degraded flight control
authority following an electrical disturbance earlier in the flight. There was
also a landing accident in 1962, although that aircraft, No. 2, was
subsequently repaired and the injured pilot survived.
"If we assume that the probability of a fatal crash is [about] 0.5% per
commercial flight, which is what X-15 actually realized during the late 1950s
and early 1960s flying the same mission (one fatal crash over 199 flights),
then the probability of Virgin Galactic crashing once over its next 131
commercial flights over the next two years, is [about] 48%," the Vertical team
says.
By the end of 2020, the company will have completed 16 of the 131 flights.
Keeping with a 0.5% per flight likelihood, the probability of Virgin Galactic
crashing during 2021 would then drop to around 44%. "We don't estimate a
probability of it crashing in a subsequent flight (beyond 131), but we do
assume a crash out there doesn't result in a program pause or meaningful loss
of revenue subsequently," they say.
Another way to look at the potential effect of a fatal crash on a space tourism
business is whether customer demand would evaporate. Here, Genovesi dives
through space shuttle history for indications. That fleet made 135
spaceflights, including four flights during developmental testing in 1981-82
and then 131 operational flights from 1982-2011. Five fully functioning orbiter
vehicles were built, two of which were destroyed, one during launch and one
during reentry, killing the entire seven-person crew in each instance. The
fatal mishaps represent about 1.5% of total missions flown.
The Space Transportation System used a significantly different configuration to
get into orbit, including dual solid rocket boosters and a shuttle, all
strapped to an even larger external fuel tank. The orbiters were built to take
a 60,000-lb. payload up to 110 nm or a 35,000-lb. payload to 220 nm. By
contrast, SS2s are designed to take six passengers up 50 nm without
accelerating to orbital speeds to launch payloads.
"The shuttle program didn't end after its two catastrophes—and neither did the
X-15 program after its fatal crash, and neither did the Virgin Galactic program
after its fatal crash," says Genovesi's report. Instead, after the Challenger
disaster, NASA built another shuttle.
That was possible due to widespread public support for the space program. In
fact, applications to become a NASA astronaut rose after both fatal accidents
(see chart above).
Analysts believe public support is even more pervasive now. They cite a 2019
Pew Research study that found 58% of Americans polled think human astronauts
are essential, while half think human space travel will become routine in the
next half-century. More than 40% indicated interest in traveling to space
themselves. Regarding private space exploration companies, about 77% of
respondents indicated a fair amount or great confidence that they could build
safe and reliable spacecraft.
Finally, the analysts point to extreme mountain climbers, a niche group of
usually highly ambitious and wealthy individuals. They note that around 5% of
the roughly 2,000 people who attempt to climb mountains at least 8,000 m
(26,000 ft.) tall die every year trying.
"Said differently, [about] 5% of the die-hards do literally die," Genovesi
wrote. "Everyone who tries knows what he's getting into and chooses to devote
significant time and resources to the adventure anyway. Virgin Galactic is
counting on a similar commitment from its customers wherein there is some
meaningful risk of [a] fatal accident, even if they can't exactly quantify it."
cid:image003.jpg@01D5C226.FA63D4D0
<https://aviationweek.com/author/michael-bruno> Michael Bruno
Based in Washington, Michael Bruno is Aviation Week Network's Senior Business
Editor and Community and Conference Content Manager. He covers aviation,
aerospace and defense businesses, their supply chains and related issues.