[AR] Re: What blew up Crew Dragon...

  • From: Henry Vanderbilt <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 21:38:14 -0700

As my non-evil twin has pointed out, the problem here wasn't fuel and oxidizer meeting in the He press system, it was oxidizer alone (plus a fast pulse of high-pressure He) making fuel of a check valve that wasn't supposed to be fuel...

But yeah, AIUI some systems do use a common He bottle to pressurize both fuel and oxidizer, and depend on check valves to keep the two from ever meeting back in the common parts of the press plumbing.  This strikes me as workable for a short-life expendable system that starts from a clean-parts-assembled known state.  But yes, very sporty for any sort of long life reusable system - because given enough time and operating cycles fluids ALWAYS migrate to places they're not supposed to.

As for the penalty for completely separate press systems, well, obviously some amount of additional mass, parts-count, and cost. Parts count and cost should be easily figureable for a given design.  The exact amount of extra mass depends on how precisely it's affordable to size things to their tasks.  In the real world with a limited range of tubing, press bottle, valve, and fitting sizes in the catalog, probably some noticeable chunk of extra mass.

Henry

On 7/15/2019 7:19 PM, Paul Breed wrote:

How big is the penalty for completely separate pressurization systems.....

On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 5:30 PM Henry Vanderbilt <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

    And if that check valve was already leaking, some sort of grit or
    contamination as the original cause is a pretty good bet.

    Guessing at "what were they thinking" here...  The SuperDraco
    thrusters were originally going to be used routinely to land the
    capsule.  Hence, design them for easy turnaround - check valves to
    keep propellant out of the He press system, rather than burst
    discs that'd need replacing after every flight.  Now, of course,
    the SuperDracos will only be used for a presumably rare abort, so
    burst discs are tolerable.

    As for titanium rather than, say, stainless, presumably that's to
    save mass.

    On a pressure-fed thruster system that is to be routinely used,
    possibly pressurized more than once per flight, any thoughts on
    how to avoid such issues?  Off the top of my head, doing sensitive
    fuel/oxidizer detection on the He side of the press system during
    servicing is one possibility.  If you find traces, inspect the
    check valves.  Maybe pull vac on the He system to detect any leaky
    check valves.  Maybe combine the two, doing propellant detection
    on the evacuated stream as you pull the He system down to vac.

    Or, in-flight, propellant detection upstream of the He check
    valves - or even simple liquid detection - could be enough for a
    no-go warning.  Or a "slow press only, if you MUST use these
    thrusters" warning.

    Henry

    On 7/15/2019 3:58 PM, Ben Brockert wrote:
    Titanium is dramatically less compatible with oxidizers than
    aluminum is. It's sensitive to impact with N2O4, especially when
    there's grit or filings in the impact, and check valves are
    really effective at creating impacts and finding grit.

    On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 3:28 PM Henry Vanderbilt
    <hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>
    wrote:

        On 7/15/2019 3:13 PM, Henry Vanderbilt wrote:
        On 7/15/2019 1:05 PM, George Herbert wrote:
                *Lars Osborne (@lars_0 <https://twitter.com/lars_0?s=11>)*
        7/15/19, 12:51 PM
        <https://twitter.com/lars_0/status/1150855437765316608?s=11>
        I work with hypergolic propellants now. I feel pretty
        satisfied with this explanation and think it has lessons
        for the industry.
        What is missing is that the destruction of the check valve
        exposed bare Ti and accelerated the metal chips into the
        MON tank at high velocity. pic.twitter.com/09ud6OZFMv
        <https://t.co/09ud6OZFMv>


        Lars posted this a bit ago as the SpaceX failure analysis
        went public. Basically, slug of NTO migrated upstream past
        a He check valve, pushed back downstream on subsequent
        pressurization to fracture the check valve and throw
        Titanium metal fragments into the NTO tank...

        Fix is replacing with burst discs.


        Replacing He propellant pressurization check valves with
        burst discs?  I'm not following your thinking here...  Or
        are you saying, adding burst discs by the check valves?
        <Emily Litella>  Never mind!  I went on to read the SpaceX
        piece, and their cure is to make the high-thrust escape
        rockets one-time activation by subbing burst discs for the
        check valves in the high-speed He press system, thus
        eliminating this particular failure probability. </Emily Litella>

        Interesting that high-velocity NTO igniting the inside of the
        Ti check valve is described as a surprise, and something not
        seen before.  I'd assume Ti is like Al in inherently forming
        a surface oxide layer that makes it compatible with strong
        oxidizers, unless something is actively scrubbing off the
        oxide layer.  So, was it the check valve slamming open too
        hard with NTO present?  Or could high enough velocity NTO
        fluid perhaps directly scrub the Ti down to bare metal?

        Henry




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